Deployment

afhttp has two roles, and they deploy differently:

The driver (afhttp fetch / cdp / upload / panel / health / capabilities / tabs) is a thin client. Install it wherever the agent runs — no container needed.
The host (afhttp host) runs a real browser, holds browser profile state, and exposes a CDP endpoint. Run the host in a container. That is the supported deployment, and this spore ships one at container/docker/.

Why the host belongs in a container

afhttp keeps Chromium’s OS sandbox on by default — running unsandboxed against untrusted, often adversarial pages is the weakest posture, so it must be opt-in, not the default. The shipped image sets AFHTTP_NO_SANDBOX=1, which makes the host launch Chromium with --no-sandbox --disable-setuid-sandbox (Chromium’s own sandbox can’t initialize as root without user namespaces anyway) — the container then is the isolation boundary. Run afhttp host natively only on a trusted host; there the sandbox stays on (set AFHTTP_NO_SANDBOX=1 yourself only in an environment where Chromium’s sandbox can’t start). The host loads untrusted web content and holds live cookies/sessions, so it should run isolated and disposable:

non-root (the image already runs as an unprivileged afhttp user),
the default seccomp profile and dropped capabilities,
--shm-size=2g (or a /dev/shm mount) for Chromium on the takeover-ready host; --takeover-provider off builds lean down to --shm-size=1g,
on a private network — never host networking with the port exposed publicly.

--no-sandbox is not a fingerprinting concern, so do not trade the container’s posture away chasing one: it is invisible to page JavaScript. Enabling Chromium’s own sandbox inside the container would mean handing it --cap-add=SYS_ADMIN, which gives away more isolation than it buys back.

It is visible to the human on the takeover display. An earlier revision of this paragraph claimed Chromium 151 shows no “unsupported command-line flag” warning for --no-sandbox; that was wrong. Chromium 151 and Brave both raise the bar, and it names --disable-setuid-sandbox first only because Chromium reports a single offending flag — remove that one and the bar returns naming --no-sandbox. The image suppresses it with a managed policy (container/docker/install-browser-policy.sh), which changes no launch flag and no sandbox posture. Do not try --test-type for this: it makes Brave abort on startup.

Timezone

The image carries tzdata and honours TZ, and it is worth setting: a container left on the default UTC while its egress IP geolocates somewhere else is a mismatch a site can see, and UTC is the giveaway default of a server rather than a desktop. Set it to match the exit IP the host actually browses from — including the proxy’s location when --proxy-url is in play, not the machine’s:

docker run -e TZ=America/Los_Angeles ...

afhttp deliberately does not pick one for you. There is no value that is right for every deployment, and guessing wrong replaces one mismatch with another.

Graphics

The host never passes --disable-gpu. That flag switches off the GPU process and takes WebGL with it — a browser launched that way reports webgl: false, webgl2: false and zero WebGL extensions, which no real browser does and every anti-bot scorer treats as automation. The host passes --enable-unsafe-swiftshader instead: hardware GL still wins wherever it exists, and containers without a GPU fall back to SwiftShader with full WebGL 1 + 2. The software renderer does report a SwiftShader UNMASKED_RENDERER_WEBGL string, which is its own weak signal, but a present-and-software WebGL grades far better than an absent one. --browser-arg=--disable-gpu remains available for callers who want the old behaviour.

Quick start

The driver embeds the host image recipe, so a brew-only install (no source tree) can stand up a host in one command:

# Build the image if needed and run the host. Auto-detects Docker or Apple
# `container`; add optional backends with repeated --with (see below). The host
# is takeover-ready by default (Brave + KasmVNC + ephemeral initial profile + 2g shm).
afhttp container install

# Lean headless host instead (no takeover, 1g shm):
afhttp container install --takeover-provider off

# Show the running host, its endpoint, and a ready-to-run driver command:
afhttp container status

# Capture a structured log summary, or explicitly stream raw logs:
afhttp container logs
afhttp container logs --raw --follow

# Tear it down (--purge also drops the image and build cache):
afhttp container uninstall --purge

install does not compile afhttp: it builds the canonical container/docker/Dockerfile with --build-arg AFHTTP_BIN_FROM=downloader, selecting a stage that downloads the prebuilt release binary matching the driver’s own version and the image architecture (x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu for Docker on Intel, aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu for Apple container and arm64 Docker). BuildKit skips the unused builder (Rust) stage, so the image stays a slim debian:trixie-slim with no toolchain and needs no source tree. The version is hard-pinned: if no release asset exists for this version/arch (e.g. a dev build of an unreleased version), the build fails with a pointer to the from-source path below — it never installs a different version.

Runtime selection is --runtime docker|podman|apple (auto-detected in that order: docker, then podman, then Apple container), or the AFHTTP_CONTAINER_RUNTIME env var. Podman behaves like Docker (rootless, no daemon); Apple container builds linux/arm64 and is started for you (container system start) and has no compose, so on macOS the afhttp container path — not compose — is how you run a host.

From a source checkout (development, or to run an unreleased version that has no published release asset), pass --from-source: instead of downloading the prebuilt binary, it builds the full container/docker/Dockerfile from the current directory, or from --context <dir>. If you run the command from an agent scratch directory, afhttp also falls back to the source checkout that built the current binary when that checkout is still available. This works under any runtime — the Dockerfile is runtime-agnostic — giving a 2×2 of {prebuilt, from-source} × {docker/podman, apple}:

afhttp container install                              # prebuilt, takeover-ready
afhttp container install --takeover-provider off               # lean headless host
afhttp container install --from-source                # source build, auto runtime
afhttp container install --runtime apple --from-source  # source build under Apple

Version upgrades and profile preservation

Managed images are tagged with the driver version (afhttp-host:<version>), and the prebuilt path downloads that exact AFHTTP_VERSION into the image. After upgrading the local driver, run afhttp container install again: the new driver builds/uses the matching image, stops and removes the old afhttp-host container, and starts a replacement with the same named data volume (afhttp-host-data by default). The host token and persistent profiles live in that volume under /data/afhttp, so they survive the recreate; only ephemeral profile state (--profile -) is intentionally disposable.

afhttp container status reports both the driver version and the running host version. fetch --takeover auto-discovery refuses a standard local host whose version differs from the driver and tells you to rerun afhttp container install, rather than silently driving a stale protocol surface.

Caveat for --from-source under Apple container: its builder runs in a separate persistent VM that defaults to 2 GiB, and compiling afhttp pulls chromiumoxide (its CDP-bindings crate needs several GB for one rustc), so the build OOM-kills at the default size. The -m flag on container build does not resize that VM — you must resize the builder itself once (8 GiB is enough; the 2 GiB default is not):

container builder stop && container builder delete
container builder start --cpus 4 --memory 8g

After that, from-source builds and runs fine under Apple container. (The prebuilt download path never compiles, so it is unaffected and needs no resizing.)

Or, from the repository root, drive the runtime CLI directly (Apple’s container is docker-shaped, so the same Dockerfile builds under it with --platform linux/arm64):

# Build the host image (chromium only; build context is the spore root):
docker build -t afhttp-host -f container/docker/Dockerfile .

# Run it. The entrypoint generates a bearer token secret on first start and
# prints it along with a ready-to-run driver command. Persistent profiles and the
# host token live in the volume.
docker run --rm -p 9222:9222 --shm-size=1g -v afhttp-profile:/data afhttp-host

# …or with compose (toggles backends via WITH_* env, see below):
docker compose -f container/docker/compose.yaml up --build

On the machine running the container, the standard afhttp-host is found without being named — its endpoint and token are read from the container itself:

afhttp fetch https://example.com

From anywhere else, name the host and where its token is (see CLI Reference for every source):

afhttp fetch https://example.com \
  --endpoint-url wss://<host>:9222 --token-secret file:$HOME/.afhttp/hosts.json#box.token_secret

Security

The CDP endpoint is full control of the browser and its profile (cookies, live sessions, downloads), so the container is token-by-default: if you don’t pass AFHTTP_TOKEN_SECRET, the entrypoint generates a 32-byte base64url token secret and persists it to the profile volume (/data/afhttp/host-token). Set AFHTTP_TOKEN_SECRET yourself to pin it. The managed afhttp container commands do not print this long-lived token unless you pass --reveal-token-secret; takeover links use short-lived handoff URLs instead.

afhttp does not terminate TLS. For cross-host use, keep the endpoint on a private network and reach it as wss:// through a mesh/proxy that provides TLS. Never expose a tokenless endpoint on a public interface.

Optional backends (build args)

Chromium is always present (backends auto / chromium). The rest are opt-in at build time and arch-guarded (several upstreams ship x86_64-only Linux builds):

Build arg	Adds backend(s)	Arch
`WITH_LIGHTPANDA=1`	`lightpanda`	x86_64 + arm64
`WITH_FINGERPRINT_CHROMIUM=1`	`fingerprint-chromium`	x86_64
`WITH_CAMOUFOX=1`	`camoufox` (+ foxbridge)	x86_64 + arm64
`WITH_CHROME=1`	`chrome`	x86_64 + arm64
`WITH_BRAVE=1`	`brave`	x86_64 + arm64
`WITH_KASMVNC=1`	KasmVNC display provider for `--takeover-provider kasmvnc`	x86_64 + arm64

docker build -t afhttp-host:stealth \
  --build-arg WITH_BRAVE=1 --build-arg WITH_KASMVNC=1 \
  -f container/docker/Dockerfile .

The pinned/download recipes live in one place — container/docker/install-backends.sh — shared with the test image (tests/Dockerfile.test) so they cannot drift. Chrome and Brave are installed from their vendors’ stable apt repositories because both publish architecture-native Debian packages; Google shipped native arm64 Linux builds in July 2026, so WITH_CHROME=1 now resolves on both architectures.

Proprietary browsers (Chrome / Edge)

Neither can be redistributed, so neither is in a default image. WITH_CHROME=1 (--with chrome) installs Chrome from Google’s apt repository into an image you build locally, which is not redistribution — that is the supported way to get Chrome, and it is the one takeover backend besides Brave.

Edge, and any Chrome build you would rather pin yourself, still mount from the host:

docker run --rm -p 9222:9222 --shm-size=1g \
  -v /opt/google/chrome:/opt/google/chrome:ro \
  afhttp-host --browser chrome --browser-bin /opt/google/chrome/chrome

(--browser chrome also works when the binary is already on PATH.)

Human takeover

Human takeover is real-display takeover backed by KasmVNC. The default afhttp container install host is takeover-ready (Brave + KasmVNC + ephemeral initial profile + 2g /dev/shm); a raw afhttp host opts in with --takeover-provider kasmvnc.

Takeover needs a headful browser on that display, not one specific vendor: brave (default) and chrome both qualify. Swap with

afhttp container install --with chrome --with kasmvnc -- --browser chrome

Both clear the same Cloudflare walls, so this is not a bot-wall ranking. Pick Chrome when you want the most common fingerprint on the web, or when a login flow breaks because Brave’s Shields block its third-party auth scripts; stay on Brave for a default install that pulls no proprietary vendor binary and for captures kept clear of ads and trackers.

If a wall serves a challenge that never becomes clickable, suspect the host before the browser. That symptom was afhttp’s own doing until the WebGL and forced---browser-arg defects below were fixed, and it looked exactly like a browser-quality problem.

The driver-side entry point is:

afhttp fetch "$URL" --takeover

fetch --takeover auto-discovers the standard local afhttp-host when no endpoint is supplied, switches the host to the URL-derived persistent site profile (e.g. contabo.com), opens or reuses a persistent tab, and navigates it. If the warmed profile already reaches the target, it returns the content. Otherwise it returns a next_action with kind: "human_takeover", a complete short-lived takeover_url_secret a human opens to drive the real display, expiry metadata, and a recommended_command that re-fetches the same --tab once the wall is cleared. For remote/custom hosts, pass --endpoint-url ws://<host>:9222 --token-secret "<token-secret>"; the token is used to mint the handoff URL and is not embedded in it. afhttp panel --endpoint-url … --token-secret … prints a short-lived display URL directly.

If the takeover host still fails, the likely remaining causes are IP/network reputation, account state, or site policy rather than the takeover surface. See architecture.md §9.

Lifecycle

afhttp host is a single long-running foreground process; it manages its own browser (and, with KasmVNC, its own Xvnc) — so there is no supervisor inside the image. Process lifecycle (restart policy, scaling, scheduling) stays the operator’s responsibility, exactly as the rest of the contract assumes.